OVERVIEW

Proper modular design can make a system more flexible, easier to maintain and update, and most of all, can help get the design completed faster. In fact, modules or subsystems design can happen in parallel, and can be out-sourced when convenient. Subsystems can also be conveniently replaced during the life of an application to simplify maintenance and allow upgrades. In many situations though, it can be extremely important to verify compatibility of the replacement module in order to ensure the system performs to specifications, maintains quality standards and/or allows safe operation of the whole system. As an example, we offer the case of a mobile phone with its rechargeable battery module. Batteries can be based on different technologies (NiCd, NiMH, Li Ion, etc.) that, in turn, require different charging algorithms. A mismatch would lead to potentially dangerous situations (including as an extreme, fire and explosion of the battery pack) severely compromising the safety of use of the whole product. The situation is different in the case of security applications (such as modular Home Alarm systems) where module validation is required to prevent tampering of the system, theft, and intrusion.

This Application Note concentrates on the use of the HCS410 transcoder to implement a reliable (yet low cost) method for module authentication using the KEELOQ® technology.

A MODULAR SYSTEM

In the following sections, we will consider a simple system composed of two modules: a main module containing a microprocessor, and a replaceable module containing some kind of I/O circuitry. As a design constraint we will assume the replaceable I/O module to be very cost-sensitive. The main module will be able to recognize I/O module replacements and determine if the new modules are compatible. Compatibility will be considered granted if the new modules are "proved" to be manufactured from the same company that manufactures the main module or a licensed third party.

The reader will further note how the Interconnection represents in all respects a third important subsystem, with cost and reliability as the main constraints on its specification. For simplicity, we will consider it to be based on low cost cabling with as few contacts (wires) as possible.

FIGURE 1: A SIMPLE MODULAR SYSTEM

Notice:

This is a non-restricted version of Application Note AN825 which is available under the KEELOQ License Agreement. All Application Notes under the KEELOQ License Agreement are contained in the KEELOQ CD DS51773.
SERIALIZATION OF MODULES

The first step in module production control involves the concept of Serialization. That is, every module produced must contain a unique Serial Number to identify it from among the entire production. Serialization is also obviously beneficial for quality control, maintenance programs, etc., although here we specify the Serial Number must be machine-readable. In other words, we require the replaceable module to be able to provide a unique number, in a digital form, upon request over the interconnection system. At any point in time (especially before making use of any of the replaceable module functions) the main module will request this unique number and compare it against a value in the main controller non-volatile memory. The main controller can use this Serial Number to implement various types of policies, such as:

• identifying the valid replacements
• logging its value through the application life
• using it for any sort of documentation of the system history for maintenance and/or warranty checking purposes

An optimal system would also require all replaceable modules to have some read/write non-volatile memory accessible through the same communication channel. Such non-volatile memory could then be used by the manufacturer to supply calibration data for the main processor to adjust the input/output signal conditioning (correcting gains and offsets for example), as well as allow the main board to log usage information.

AUTHENTICATION OF MODULES

The problem with Serialization is in its simplicity. If the serial number is readable by the main module and its value is checked multiple times, then tapping into the interconnection system will easily provide this information. Production of multiple replacement modules with the same Serial Number is trivial. All the modules would appear the same to the main board. It would actually be impossible to detect any change or replacement.

In everyday life, we use IDs and signatures to authenticate individuals with the assumption that they cannot be easily counterfeited or duplicated. But in the digital world, duplicating a Serial Number is almost too easy. It is similar to the instance in a bank where, to get access to our accounts, we were requested to supply a password and we had to say it aloud in front of other people. If the password is fixed, then as soon as we use it, it is compromised.

A solution to the authentication problem, consists in making it possible to deduce whether something or somebody knows (or contains) a number (a password or a key) without ever communicating it, or exposing it to cloning.
IDENTIFY FRIEND OR FOE (IFF)

The IFF anti-cloning technique that is used in the following section is simple, yet very effective.

The term IFF is believed to be traced to its first use in the aviation industry, where it was employed in the radar systems to distinguish approaching Friend planes from the enemies (or Foes).

The main IFF concept is based on the use of formulas instead of fixed values during the authentication process. In our simple system, the main processor sends a large random number (usually referred to as the “challenge”) to the replaceable module. The module would apply a convened formula to the challenge value, compute a “response” value and send it back to the main processor. The main processor would compare the returned value with the locally computed value. If the formula used by the replaceable module is the correct one, the main processor finds a match and accepts the new module as compatible or ‘authentic’, as shown in Figure 2.

The reader will note how, during the entire transaction, no detail of the formula is ever communicated between the two modules. Tapping into the interconnection system will not reveal any information that could be used in the creation of a duplicate module, since the challenge value is always different, possibly even random.

For increased security, the process can be repeated as many times as required to achieve the requested level of confidence.

Of course there are many factors to be considered that influence the overall security of the system. Among these factors are:

1. the computational complexity of the formula
2. the bit length of the challenge and response
3. the encryption/decryption keys are never exchanged between the two modules

FIGURE 2:  IFF OR CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

![Diagram showing IFF challenge and response process]
**KEELOQ - IFF**

A KEELOQ IFF system adds a little twist to the standard IFF mechanism. The process takes advantage of the symmetrical nature of the KEELOQ block cipher. KEELOQ is a robust, field proven, 64-bit key encryption engine (block cipher) operating on 32-bit (data blocks): challenge and response. The method is illustrated by the following sequence of steps:

1. A 32-bit challenge \((x)\) is generated by the Main Module (optimally as a random value).
2. The challenge is sent to the Replaceable Module.
3. The Replaceable Module authentication device (HCS410) uses the KEELOQ encryption algorithm to generate a 32-bit Response \((y)\) and sends it back.
4. The Main module applies the KEELOQ decryption algorithm to the 32-bit response generating a new 32-bit value \((x')\).
5. The result of the decryption process \((x')\) is compared with the original Challenge \((x)\).
6. If the two values match, the Replaceable module is verified to be compatible and can be used further by the Main module.

If the Replaceable module is not compatible, any attempt to guess the right response value \((y)\) for a given challenge \((x)\) has a probability of \(1/2^{32}\) or in other words, one in four billion. The challenge and response process can then be repeated (looping through steps 1 to 6) to increase the verification security as required, effectively extending the equivalent challenge and response length by two, three.. n-times.

The resulting level of security provided by this system would still not be recommended for high-level monetary transactions, where 128-bit key (and higher) systems are considered the norm. However, Embedded Applications in the consumer and industrial field can get an exceptional level of security while achieving an optimal compromise with system cost.

**FIGURE 3: KEELOQ® - IFF**

![Diagram of KEELOQ® - IFF](image)
THE HCS410 TRANSCODER

For the cost of a single KEELOQ HCS410 transcoder (transponder and encoder) device on the replaceable module, only one I/O line (one wire) in the interconnection, and a few lines of code on the main board processor, the user gets a very high level Authentication system, including serialization and R/W Nonvolatile Memory features.

The HCS410 is available in an 8-pin SOIC (or DIP) package and requires no external components to operate to its full capabilities (see Figure 4, A). Its power supply ranges from 2V to 6.3V, with an operating current of less than 300 $\mu$A at 6.3V, posing no constraints on the replaceable module power supply design.

From the details provided by the HCS410 Data Sheet [DS40158] we learn that it is designed to operate in three different modes:

- as an Hopping Code encoder
- as a contact-less Transponder (see Microchip literature [DS41116] for WM package details and availability)
- as a wired Authentication device operating in KEELOQ-IFF mode (often referred to in the Data Sheet as the IFF-W mode)

In this application we will employ the HCS410 only in this third mode.

FIGURE 4: HCS410 IFF-W CONNECTIONS

In the configuration illustrated in Figure 4(B), the power supply connection of pin 8 to VDD becomes redundant, as the part derives (internally) its power supply from the same I/O (pin 7 LC0) that is used for the bi-directional communication. In this case adding a 0.1 $\mu$F capacitor (tank) on pin 8 is recommended.

The HCS410 Data I/O line is the only added wire required for the system interconnection. Correspondingly, the processor on the main module will dedicate only one extra I/O for communication with the HCS410 (see Figure 5, A). An open collector I/O will be used if available or will be emulated, by switching dynamically the I/O line from the Output low state for a logic zero (pulse), to Input (tri-state) for a logic one condition, with an external pull up resistor. When communication with the HCS410 is not requested (Standby mode), power consumption can be minimized by the main processor controlling the pull-up resistor with a second I/O (RBy) Figure 5, B. When attempting communication with the HCS410 there will be a short additional delay, necessary to charge up the tank capacitor through the pull-up resistor and internal voltage regulator, before the device powers up.

FIGURE 5: PIC® MCU IFF-W CONNECTION
HCS410 IFF OPERATION
Communication with the HCS410 over the Data I/O line uses a Pulse Position Modulation format. The protocol is asymmetrical, meaning that the encoding of ones and zeros differs depending on the direction of communication. This also provides for power supply over the same data line, while optimizing communication speed. When communicating to the HCS410, data and command bits are expressed with the modulation format represented in Figure 6 below.

FIGURE 6: COMMANDS TO THE HCS410

Where TE represents the basic Time Element which can be configured to be 100 $\mu$s or 200 $\mu$s, by setting appropriately the TBSL bit in the device configuration memory.

When the HCS410 sends data bits back, they are expressed with the modulation format represented in Figure 7 below.

FIGURE 7: RESPONSES FROM THE HCS410

Communication activity with the HCS410 always starts with the wait for a specific 5-bit pattern of (01010) known as the Acknowledge Pulse, see Figure 8.

The device will send a new Acknowledge Pulse sequence immediately after a successful Power-up Reset, and will repeat the pattern periodically while waiting for a command.

The internal clock oscillator of the HCS410 is based on an RC circuit and can be calibrated by programming the OSCCAL bits in the device configuration memory.

A device programmer can make use of the Acknowledge Pulse sequence to verify such calibration or to finely tune (auto-baudrate) the communication routines.

In the following, for simplicity, we will consider that the HCS410 clock oscillator has been calibrated.

FIGURE 8: ACKNOWLEDGE PULSES

All activity of the HCS410 is performed exclusively in response to specific 5-bit commands. The available commands offer a very powerful set of functions for Authentication applications:

- IFF-Encryption using one of two possible 64-bit keys stored in the device configuration memory
- Read and Write access to four independent 16-bit locations of nonvolatile memory (EEPROM)
- Read access to a 32-bit Serial Number, split in two 16-bit words for convenience
- Write access to the device Configuration word (protected by a special 32-bit transport code)
- The ability to reconfigure the entire device memory, including all keys and calibration parameters

TABLE 1: IFF COMMANDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00001</td>
<td>Read Configuration word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00010</td>
<td>Read low serial number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00011</td>
<td>Read high serial number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001XX</td>
<td>Read user area (00, 01, 10, 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01000</td>
<td>Configure HCS410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01001</td>
<td>Write Configuration word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01010</td>
<td>Write low serial number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01011</td>
<td>Write high serial number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>011XX</td>
<td>Write user area (00, 01, 10, 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10001</td>
<td>IFF Encryption using KEY-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10101</td>
<td>IFF Encryption using KEY-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commands must be sent to the HCS410 immediately after receiving the Acknowledge Pulse sequence. After completion of one command, the user must wait for the next Acknowledge Pulse sequence from the HCS410 before requesting a new operation.
When sending a command to the HCS410 and subsequently, when sending packets of 16 or 32 data bits, a long START bit (2Te) is required as illustrated in Figure 9.

**FIGURE 9: COMMAND-DATA START BIT**

Commands that read and write to memory locations will require 16-bit packets of data to be sent after the command (and a short delay of 1.8 ms) and will respond with packets of the same size.

Encryption commands for authentication, require 32 bits of data to be sent after the command, and respond with the same data length.

Finally, configuration commands are protected by a special 32-bit code, known as the Transport Code. It acts as the secret combination of a safe, and prevents the device configuration from being lost, should a communication error transform a normal command into a configuration command.

Responses from the HCS410 on the contrary, are always preceded by a (single Te) START pulse, followed by a fixed preamble composed of a (0, 1) pattern as shown in Figure 10.

**FIGURE 10: RESPONSE PREAMBLE**

A more complete summary of the IFF commands and waveforms can be found in Figure 11 and Table 2.
FIGURE 11: IFF COMMANDS AND WAVEFORMS

![Waveform Diagram](image)

TABLE 2: IFF TIMING PARAMETERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Typical</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PPM Command Bit Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data = 1</td>
<td>TBITC</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>TE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data = 0</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPM Response Bit Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data = 1</td>
<td>TBITR</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>TE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data = 0</td>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPM Command Minimum High Time</td>
<td>TPMH</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>TE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response Time (Minimum for Read)</td>
<td>TRT</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>ms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opcode to Data Input Time</td>
<td>TOTD</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>ms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Code to Data Input Time</td>
<td>TTTD</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>ms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFF EEPROM Write Time (16 bits)</td>
<td>TWR</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>ms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPLICATION SOFTWARE

The following sections of this Application Note will concentrate on the software. We will develop a small set of functions for communication with an HCS410 in authentication applications. The code was written as a set of relocatable object modules. While the use of relocatable modules and a linker is natural for high level language programmers, many programmers familiar with the Microchip PIC MCU assembler MPASM™, might not be familiar with the use of MPLINK™ object linker and the techniques required to produce relocatable object modules in assembler. Figure 12 illustrates the adopted project structure.

For convenience, as a hardware target we used the KEELOQ Evaluation Kit II (DM303006) as the Main module, and we will use the prototype area to connect an HCS410 in the configuration represented in Figure 4 (B).

The demonstration code can be downloaded to the PIC16F877 present on the demo board through the serial port using the Evaluation Kit windows software (Download Firmware function). Alternatively the user will be able to connect the In-Circuit Debugger MPLAB® ICD to the J4 connector on the same demo board. This second arrangement will also permit the user to insert breakpoints and view the contents of RAM and EEPROM while exploring the code and the device functionality.

FIGURE 12: PROJECT STRUCTURE

As shown in Figure 12, there are several source files that contribute to the creation of the demonstration application. In order of importance, these files are:

- the EVKIT.H include file, containing the definitions of all the I/Os of the PIC16F877 that controls the KEELOQ EVALUATION KIT II main board
- the HCS410.ASM module, containing all the communication specific functions that will be analyzed in detail in the following sections
- the FASTDEC.ASM module, containing the standard KEELOQ decrypt module
- the TEST.ASM module, containing the Main Loop of the demonstration application
- the KEELOQ.LKR linker script, that defines the memory allocation rules to be used by the linker when assembling the object modules together.

WRITING RELOCATABLE CODE

The reader should refer to the “MPASM™ Assembler, MPLINK™ Object Linker, MPLIB™ Object Librarian User’s Guide” (DS33014) for more details and programming examples with special reference to Chapter 4: “Using MPASM™ to Create Relocatable Objects.”

THE HCS410 MODULE

The HCS410 module exports four global functions for easy access to the main functionality offered by the HCS410 transcoder. They are:

- 32-bit data Encryption with one of two 64-bit keys
- Read access to non volatile memory (4 x 16 bits)
- Write access to non volatile memory (4 x 16 bits)
- 32-bit Serial Number read
The module uses four RAM locations (in an overlay segment) as local variables and temporaries, and it references to one external 32-bit buffer (HOP0..HOP3) for data I/O.

In order to keep the code simple and let the reader concentrate on the core concepts of the communication mechanism, all of the HCS410 communication routines have been written for the most generic PIC MCU using only the Watchdog Timer (as a time-out mechanism) in all waiting loops. This means that if, at any time, the communication fails, or the HCS410 does not respond (or is missing from the replaceable module), the Main module will RESET, preventing the application from executing further.

The following sections will describe the design and use of the routines composing the HCS410.ASM module from the bottom up.

The Delay routine provides multiple of 4 μs delays and adapts to three different clock frequencies: 4 MHz, 8 MHz and 20 MHz depending on the definition of the CLOCK variable (by default CLOCK is defined to be equal to 20 MHz that is the oscillator frequency used by the KEELOQ Evaluation Kit II demo board).

The WaitFall function is one of the main building blocks of the communication routine. Its role is fundamental in the receiving of the special PPM modulation format used by the HCS410 device. WaitFall loops, polling the Data I/O line until a falling edge is detected (pulse) and returns with a ‘0’ or a ‘1’, depending on whether the pulse was detected before or after a specific lapsed time (1.5 TE).

**FIGURE 13: WAITFALL OPERATION**

The ReceiveData function uses the WaitFall function to discriminate actual data bits sent by the HCS410. ReceiveData also synchronizes on the START pulse and discards the Preamble (0,1) pattern. The Preamble pattern is extremely valuable in wireless applications to distinguish the transcoder response from the reader circuit noise, but in a wired application, such as the one we are developing, there is no use for it.

Receive Data assembles CNTBIT bits in bytes and proceeds filling the HOP buffer.

The inner loop, labeled ReceiveBit, is also used by the GetACK function to capture the Acknowledge pulses and compare them against the specific (01010) ACK pattern.

The function SendData, performs the opposite task, sending CNTBIT bits from the HOP buffer over the Data I/O line, according to the defined PPM format.

The SendCommand function uses the inner loop of the SendData function to send a 5-bit command.

Finally, let’s review the main four functions that the HCS410.ASM declares as global for other modules to use. Encrypt1 and Encrypt2 respectively request the HCS410 to perform KEELOQ encryption on a 32-bit challenge value taken from the HOP buffer, using the first or second 64-bit key available. The function will return with the 32-bit response in the same HOP buffer.

ReadUserData requests the HCS410 to perform a 16-bit data read command from one of the four User memory locations according to the value of the W register upon call (0,1,2,3). In addition to that, if W contains the value -1 (0xFF) the 16-bit data returned will be the 16 LSb’s of the device Serial Number. If W contains the value -2 (0xFE), the 16-bit data returned will be the 16 MSb’s of the device Serial Number.

WriteUserData similarly requests the HCS410 to write a 16-bit data to one of the four User memory locations according to the value contained in the W register upon call (0,1,2,3). A write to the Serial Number locations, similarly to the operation of the ReadUserData command, is not supported in the current version (such command would require sending additional 32 bits of Transport Code before the data).

**THE FASTDEC MODULE**

The FASTDEC.ASM module contains a fast implementation of the KEELOQ Decryption algorithm. It declares a single GLOBAL label Decrypt. This function requires the FSR register to point to an 64-bit array (8 bytes) containing the Crypt Key to be used and operates on an EXTERN 32-bit buffer (HOP0..HOP3) which is holding the data. The decryption function performs 32-bit data decryption in about 16,000 Tcycles (corresponding to about 3 ms @ 20 MHz) and returns the 32-bit output in the same buffer (HOP0..HOP3).

As in every good encryption system, security must not rely on the secrecy of the algorithm used, but solely on the secrecy of the crypt keys used. In a KEELOQ system, there is no exception to this rule: proper key management is vital. In fact, while the KEELOQ algorithm is not secret (although it is patented and released only under license), the secrecy of the crypt keys chosen is of utmost importance.
In many KEELOQ Hopping code applications, it is recommended to use special Key Generation techniques, (simple, normal, secure, etc.), to make the key used by every single unit different and unique. In KEELOQ IFF technology this is not necessary, because of its very nature, the challenge/response system already provides a very high level of security (provided a good random generation algorithm is used for calculating the challenge).

It must be remembered, however, that if a simple single crypt key (Manufacturer’s Code) system is chosen, then the disclosure of this 64-bit value to third parties and subcontractors becomes extremely critical.

THE TEST MODULE

The TEST.ASM module contains some basic code to initialize the PIC MCU for the Evaluation Kit II board hardware configuration and to demonstrate the functionality of the HCS410 module.

In detail, the main loop will cyclically perform the following operations:

1. Request the Serial Number.
2. Write to all three 16-bit locations in User non-volatile memory.
3. Read back the written values.
4. Generate a pseudo random challenge (using the KEELOQ decrypt function with a different key provides a good random number generator.
5. Send the challenge and request an Encryption with one of the two keys contained in the HCS410 device.
6. Send the response to the Fastdec function and, finally, compare it to the original challenge.

If there is a match, the loop continues. Otherwise, an error is reported and the board RESETS.

MODULE AUTHENTICATION APPLICATIONS

It must be noted that there are two main categories of applications where the Module Authentication system, as illustrated in this Application Note, can be conveniently employed. The difference between the two can be better explained with example applications. The first category, “closed systems”, can be represented by a cellular phone and its battery pack. Let’s say the HCS410 (authentication device) is placed in the battery pack and one contact is added to the battery to allow for the IFF bi-directional communication. This would force the replacement of the battery with the manufacturer’s original batteries only. If a user wants to bypass the authentication mechanism, the phone (a closed system) must be disassembled. This not only voids any warranty, but is also perceived by the average user as a risky operation and is unlikely to be performed. On the contrary, in an “open system” such as an industrial rack-mounted stack module (or the one presented at the beginning of this Application Note), there is no restriction to work-around the authentication module, since there is easy access to the interconnection system. The key to effective use of module authentication in “open systems” is to make the authenticating device an “essential” part of the system. In the replaceable module example, this would mean storing some essential configuration information such as gain or offset values of the analog I/Os present. in the User nonvolatile memory area of the HCS410. Without those values, the system cannot perform any useful operations.

MEMORY USAGE

Program memory used: 324 words.
RAM memory used: 20 bytes.

CONCLUSIONS

The code presented shows how effective the use of an HCS410 transcoder can be in a module authentication application. In summary:

• KEELOQ IFF technology offers 64-bit security in a low cost device.
• The HCS410.ASM relocatable object module can be linked in any existing application with minimal load on the PIC MCU resources.
• A single pin added to the interconnection system (single wire) provides an effective bi-directional communication path.
• Four 16-bit locations of R/W memory provide space for calibration data and/or usage statistics.
• A 32-bit serial number (read-only) allows module tagging and effective production and maintenance tracking.

There is still ample room for extension of this application code. The HCS410 includes a full Anti-Collision system that would allow the connection of multiple (HCS410) devices on a single wire, in a bus-like configuration. Authentication of multiple modules using a single PIC MCU I/O would be possible on such a bus. Further time-outs could be explicitly controlled by the use of timers (instead of the sole Watchdog Timer), to provide module “hot swapping” capabilities, such as multiple modules insertion/extraction detection.
REFERENCES

DS91002  TB003 Introduction to KEELOQ Technology
DS91000  TB001 Secure Learning RKE systems using KEELOQ Technology
DS40158  HCS410 Device Data Sheet
DS00742  AN742 Modular Mid Range Decoder
DS00744  AN744 Modular Mid Range Decoder in C
DS91041  KEELOQ Decryption Routines in C
DS00824  KEELOQ Encoders Oscillator Calibration
DS00665  Using KEELOQ to Generate Hopping Code Passwords

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Microchip's Secure Data Products are covered by some or all of the following: Code hopping encoder patents issued in European countries and U.S.A. Secure learning patents issued in European countries, U.S.A. and R.S.A.
**APPENDIX A: EVKIT.INC SOURCE CODE**

```c
;*
;** EvKit II include file
;**
;* 09/27/01 LDJ updated
;*
#define TRUE 1
#define FALSE 0

;;; serial port
#define RTS PORTC,0 ;// o
#define CTS PORTC,5 ;// i
#define TX_232 PORTC,6 ;// o
#define RX_232 PORTC,7 ;// i

;;; LCD display
#define DB4 PORTD,0 ;// i/o
#define DB5 PORTD,1 ;// i/o
#define DB6 PORTD,2 ;// i/o
#define DB7 PORTD,3 ;// i/o
#define RW PORTD,4 ;// o select RD or Write
#define RS PORTD,5 ;// o select register
#define LCD_E PORTD,6 ;// o chip select

;;; programming Socket
#define LED PORTD,7 ;// o switch on the yellow LED
#define VDD PORTD,7 ;// o set socket VDD pin to 5V

;;; encoder programming
#define S0 PORTB,0 ;// o clock
#define S1 PORTB,1 ;// o
#define S2 PORTB,2 ;// o
#define S3 PORTB,3 ;// o
#define DATA PORTA,5 ;// i/o data

;;; Step up circuit
#define VPPON PORTA,4 ;// o apply voltage
#define STEPOUT PORTC,2 ;// o PWM output pin
#define VPPRST PORTB,5 ;// o clears Vpp/ reset part
#define STEPIN PORTA,0 ;// i analog input

;;; HCS512 programming
#define DAT512 PORTA,2 ;// i/o
#define CLK512 PORTA,1 ;// i/o
#define MCL512 PORTB,4 ;// i MCLR line
```

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;;; HCS515/HCS500 programming
#define DAT515 PORTE,2 ;// i/o
#define CLK515 PORTA,3 ;// i/o

;;; transponder interface
#define PWM_COIL PORTC,1 ;// o 125kHz carrier
#define COIL_IN PORTE,1 ;// i reading transponder
#define COIL_ON PORTB,0 ;// o activate resonant circuit

;;; radio receiver
#define RFIN PORTE,0 ;// i radio input

;;; i2c interface
#define SCL PORTC,3 ;// o Serial Clock
#define SDA PORTC,4 ;// i Serial Data
#define TRIS_SDA TRISC4

;;; keypad interface
#define BOOT PORTB,4 ;// i BOOT button
#define ROW0 PORTB,0 ;// o rows
#define ROW1 PORTB,1 ;// o
#define ROW2 PORTB,2 ;// o
#define ROW3 PORTB,3 ;// o
#define COL0 PORTB,4 ;// i columns
#define COL1 PORTB,5 ;// i
#define COL2 PORTB,6 ;// i
#define COL3 PORTB,7 ;// i

;;; init masks
;;; clock/data lines to decoders are default to float at init
#define DEFPA b’11101111’; // x x DATA VPPON CLK515 DAT512 CLK512 STEPIN
#define DEFPB b’11010000’; // COL3 COL2 VPPRST COL0 S3 S2 S1 S0/COIL_ON
#define DEFFPC b’10110110’; // RX_232 TX_232 CTS SDA SCL STEPOUT PWM_COIL RTS
;;; STEPOUT defaults to input until used (external pull down)
#define DEFFPD b’00000000’; // LED E RS RW DB7..DB4
#define DEFFE b’11101111’; // x x x !PSP x DAT515 COIL_IN RFIN

#include <p16f877.inc>

; debugging macro, outputs 1 literal digit on LCD connector
DEBUG MACRO LIT
movlw LIT & 0x0f
iorwf PORTD,F
nop
nop
movlw 0xf0
andwf PORTD,F
ENDM
APPENDIX B:  TEST.ASM

;  test program for "relocatable" ENCRYPT routine
;  using an HCS410 in IFF-W mode
;
   radix hex

   include <evkit.inc>

   include "hcs410.inc" ; encryption lib module exports
   include "fastdec.inc" ; decryption lib module exports

;;----------------------------------------------------------------------------;
;
BANK1        UDATA           ; make sure gets allocated in BANK0
KEY0    RES     1       ; crypto key stored lsb first
KEY1    RES     1
KEY2    RES     1
KEY3    RES     1
KEY4    RES     1
KEY5    RES     1
KEY6    RES     1
KEY7    RES     1       ; crypto key msb
BANK0       UDATA
HOP0    RES     1       ; hopping code 32 bit register
HOP1    RES     1
HOP2    RES     1
HOP3    RES     1

; make this variables accessible to enc/decrypt modules
GLOBAL KEY0, KEY1, KEY2, KEY3, KEY4, KEY5, KEY6, KEY7
GLOBAL HOP0, HOP1, HOP2, HOP3

SN      RES     4       ; temp storage for Serial Number
CHG     RES     4       ; challenge

STARTUP    CODE
   goto    START

CODE               ; reset vector

START
   banksel TRISA
   movlw   DEFPA
   movwf   TRISA
   movlw   DEFPB
   movwf   TRISB
   movlw   DEFPD
   movwf   TRISE
   banksel ADCON1
   movlw   0x0e        ; AN0 only analog input
   movwf   ADCON1

   banksel OPTION_REG
   movlw   b'10001011' ; prescaler to WDT 1:8
   movwf   OPTION_REG
; init CRYPTO KEY
    banksel KEY0
    movlw 0xEF        ; lsb
    movwf KEY0
    movlw 0xCD
    movwf KEY1
    movlw 0xAB
    movwf KEY2
    movlw 0x89
    movwf KEY3
    movlw 0x67
    movwf KEY4
    movlw 0x45
    movwf KEY5
    movlw 0x23
    movwf KEY6
    movlw 0x01
    movwf KEY7       ; msb

; load init value for challenge
    banksel CHG
    movlw 0x67
    movwf CHG+0
    movlw 0x45
    movwf CHG+1
    movlw 0x23
    movwf CHG+2
    movlw 0x01
    movwf CHG+3

MainLoop
; 1. read Serial Number locations
    movlw -1          ; SN 16 Lsb
    call ReadUser
    movf HOP0,W      ; save value in local variable
    movwf SN+0
    movf HOP1,W
    movwf SN+1
    movlw -2          ; SN 16 Msb
    call ReadUser
    movf HOP0,W      ; save value in local variable
    movwf SN+2
    movf HOP1,W
    movwf SN+3

; 2. write to all EEPROM USER locations (4321)
    movlw 21
    movwf HOP0
    movlw 43
    movwf HOP1

    ; write to EEPROM location 0
    movlw 0
    call WriteUser

    ; write to EEPROM location 1
    movlw 1
    call WriteUser

    ; write to an EEPROM location 2
    movlw 2
    call WriteUser
; write to an EEPROM location 3
movlw  3
call  WriteUser

; 3. read back values from USER EEPROM locations
; read EEPROM location 0
movlw  0
call  ReadUser
; read EEPROM location 1
movlw  1
call  ReadUser
; read EEPROM location 2
movlw  2
call  ReadUser
; read EEPROM location 3
movlw  3
call  ReadUser

; 4. generate a new challenge (and turn off LED)
; challenges should be randomized,
; Hint: use again Keeloq with a different Crypt Key
; to act as a random number generator
; for simplicity a sequential challenge generation is used here
bcf    LED
incf   CHG+0,F
btfs   STATUS,Z
incf   CHG+1,F

; move challenge into data buffer
movf   CHG+0,W
movwf  HOP0
movf   CHG+1,W
movwf  HOP1
movf   CHG+2,W
movwf  HOP2
movf   CHG+3,W
movwf  HOP3

; 5. call HCS410 encrypt library function
call   Encrypt1

; 6. verify the response using Keeloq Decrypt
movlw  KEY0        ; enter with W pointing to CRYPTO KEY
call  Decrypt
movf   HOP0,W       ; compare decrypted response with challenge
xorwf  CHG+0,W
btfs   STATUS,Z
goto  AError
movf   HOP1,W       ; compare decrypted response with challenge
xorwf  CHG+1,W
btfs   STATUS,Z
goto  AError
movf   HOP2,W       ; compare decrypted response with challenge
xorwf  CHG+2,W
btfs   STATUS,Z
goto  AError
movf   HOP3,W       ; compare decrypted response with challenge
xorwf  CHG+3,W
btfs   STATUS,Z
goto  AError
; if successful turn LED on
   bsf LED

; 7. loop
  goto MainLoop

AError
  goto 0 ; reset in case of error

END
APPENDIX C: HCS410.INC

;******************************************************
;* Filename:  HCS410.INC
;******************************************************
;* Author: Lucio Di Jasio
;* Company: Microchip Technology
;* Revision: Rev 1.00
;* Date: 28/SEP/01
;*
;* include file that exports:
;* relocatable library function for HCS410 use
;*
;******************************************************
EXTERN Encrypt1, Encrypt2, ReadUser, WriteUser
APPENDIX D: HCS410.ASM

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;
;******************************************************************************
;*  Filename:   HCS410.ASM
;******************************************************************************
;*  Author:     Lucio Di Jasio
;*  Company:    Microchip Technology
;*  Revision:   Rev 1.00
;*  Date:       28/SEP/01
;**************************************************************
;* relocatable module that implements:
;*   Encrypt function challenging an HCS410 in IFPW
;*   encrypts the 32 bits hopping in IN HOP0 (LSB) TO HOP3(MSB)
;*   W contains pointer to HOP0
;* NOTE:
;*    local variables are assumed to be in BANK0
;*    HOP must be in BANK0 or BANK1
;*    assembled using MPASM v02.61
;**************************************************************

;******************************************************************************
;* include "evkit.inc" ; Keeloq Evaluation Kit II board I/O defs
;******************************************************************************
#define TWENTYMHZ  5
#define EIGHTMHZ   2
#define FOURMHZ    1

#define CLOCK TWENTYMHZ

EXTERN  HOP0, HOP1, HOP2, HOP3

;******************************************************************************
; HCS410 commands
;******************************************************************************
#define HCS410_RCFG  0x01       ;// read config word
#define HCS410_RSNH  0x03       ;// read SN high
#define HCS410_RSNL  0x02       ;// read SN low
#define HCS410_RU0   0x04       ;// read USER area #0
#define HCS410_RU1   0x05       ;// " " #1
#define HCS410_RU2   0x06       ;// " " #2
#define HCS410_RU3   0x07       ;// " " #3
#define HCS410_WU0   0x0c       ;// write USER area #0
#define HCS410_WU1   0x0d       ;// " " #1
#define HCS410_WU2   0x0e       ;// " " #2
#define HCS410_WU3   0x0f       ;// " " #3
#define HCS410_ENC1  0x11       ;// challenge resp. 32Bit Key1 Encrypt
#define HCS410_ENC2  0x15       ;// challenge resp. 32Bit Key2 Encrypt

#include "evkit.inc"
; Macros to control the DATA line
; implementation specific to the Keeloq Evaluation Kit II board
;
; default condition (DATA line pull-up)
PULLUP MACRO
    banksel TRISA
    bsf DATA ; make it input
    banksel PORTA
ENDM

; PPM pulse condition (DATA line to GND)
PULSE MACRO
    banksel TRISA
    bcf DATA ; make it output
    banksel PORTA
    bcf DATA ; drive LOW
ENDM

UDATA_OVR ; defines local variables (in reusable mem)
WORK RES 1
TMP RES 1
CNTBIT RES 1
DLY RES 1

.hcs410 CODE

;----------------------------------------------------------------------
Encrypt1
GLOBAL Encrypt1
      call GetACK ; synchronize

; send authentication request
      movlw HCS410_ENC1 ; encrypt request
      goto Encrypt

;----------------------------------------------------------------------
Encrypt2
GLOBAL Encrypt2
      call GetACK ; synchronize

; send authentication request
      movlw HCS410_ENC2 ; encrypt request
Encrypt
  call SendCommand

; send challenge (data to be encrypted)
      movlw .32
      call SendData

; wait for response
      movlw .32
      call ReceiveData

return

;----------------------------------------------------------------------
; Read User Data
; INPUT
;   N      0..3 select User Location
;   -1    Serial Number L
; -2 = Serial Number H
; OUTPUT:
; HOP0, HOP1 data read from user memory

ReadUser
GLOBAL ReadUser
addlw HCS410_RU0 ; make it a 410 command
movwf HOP3 ; save in temp

call GetACK ; synchronize
movf HOP3,W ; send command
call SendCommand
movlw .16
call ReceiveData ; read back 1 x16 bit word
return

;------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; Write User Data
; INPUT
; W 0..3 select User Location
; HOP0, HOP1 data to write in user memory

WriteUser
GLOBAL WriteUser
addlw HCS410_WU0 ; make it a 410 command
movwf HOP3 ; save in temp

call GetACK ; synchronize
movf HOP3,W ; send command
call SendCommand
movlw .16
call SendData ; read back 1 x16 bit word
return

;------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; Delay W x 4us
; INPUT
; W delay requested

DelayWx4us
movwf DLY ; DLY x 4us

DelayL
nop ; 1 Tcy
if CLOCK > FOURMHZ
goto $+1 ; 4 Tcy
goto $+1
endif
if CLOCK > EIGHTMHZ
goto $+1 ; 12 Tcy
goto $+1
goto $+1
goto $+1
goto $+1
endif
decfsz DLY,F ; +3 Tcy
goto DelayL
retlw 0

;------------------------------------------------------------------------------

; Wait for a Falling Edge
; INPUT
; W timeout value
; timeout = DLY x .16Tcy
;
#define KTO .16

WaitFall
    movwf DLY

WaitFallL
    nop ; 1 Tcy
    goto $+1
    goto $+1
    goto $+1
    goto $+1
    goto $+1
; if long wait some more until it falls

WaitFallTOL
    btfsc DATA
    goto WaitFallTOL
    retlw 1 ; return with TO

;----------------------------------------------------------------------
; GetACK
; loops until it receives a correct ACK pattern
;
GetACK
    PULLUP ; power up the device
    movlw .250*CLOCK/KTO
    call DelayWx4us ; pause 1ms

; wait for ACK signal
    movlw TMP
    movwf FSR ; TMP will receive the data
    movlw 3 ; read 3 bit (preceded by 01)
    movwf CNTBIT
    call ReceiveBit
    movf TMP,W
    andlw b'11100000' ; compare (upper) three bit
    xorlw b'01000000' ; match with 010 ACK pattern
    btfss STATUS,Z
    goto GetACK ; if not keep waiting
    return

;----------------------------------------------------------------------
; ReceiveData
;
; INPUT :
; W number of bit to receive
; OUTPUT:
; HOP0..HOP3 received data
;
ReceiveData
    movwf CNTBIT
    movlw HOP0 ; init pointer
    movwf FSR

ReceiveBit
; wait for start falling edge (WDT timeout)
bftsc DATA
goto ReceiveBit

; discard first two bit 01 (synch pattern)

WR1
bftss DATA
goto WR1

WF1
bftsc DATA
goto WF1

WR2
bftsc DATA
goto WR2

WF2
bftsc DATA
goto WF2

ReceiveNBL
bftss DATA ; waiting for the new rising edge
goto ReceiveNBL

; measure the delay before next gap
movlw .300*CLOCK/KTO ; timeout at 300us (1.5xTE)
call WaitFall

movwf WORK
rrf INDF,F ; rotate bit in lsb first

WR3
bftss DATA ; wait until you get to the next gap
goto WR3

; loop for every bit

decf CNTBIT,F ; every 8 bit increment pointer
movlw 0x7
andwf CNTBIT,W
bftsc STATUS,Z
incf FSR,F
movf CNTBIT,F
bftss STATUS,Z
goto ReceiveNBL
return

; SendData
; INPUT
; W number of bit to send
; HOP0..HOP3 data to send

SendData
movwf CNTBIT
movlw HOP0 ; init pointer
movwf FSR

SendCMD
movlw .250 ; max delay 256x4us = 1ms
call DelayWx4us
movlw .250 ; max delay 256x4us = 1ms
call DelayWx4us
movlw .250 ; max delay 256x4us = 1ms
call DelayWx4us
movlw .250 ; max delay 256x4us = 1ms
call DelayWx4us

PULSE
movlw .100
call DelayWx4us ; 2 x TE = 100x4us = 400us

; loop for CNTBIT
SendNBL

PULLUP
rrf INDF,F ; lsb first
movlw .150 ; bit 0-> 3 x TE = 150x4us = 600us
btfsc STATUS,C
movlw .250 ; bit 1-> 5 x TE = 250x4us = 1000us
call DelayWx4us

PULSE
movlw .50 ; 1x TE = 50x4us = 200us
call DelayWx4us

; count bit out
decf CNTBIT,F ; every 8 bit increment pointer
movlw 0x7
andwf CNTBIT,W
SKPNZ
incf FSR,F
movf CNTBIT,F
btfss STATUS,Z
goto SendNBL

PULLUP
return

;----------------------------------------------------------------------
; Send Command
;
; INPUT
;   W  HCS410_ command
;
SendCommand
movwf TMP ; save command in temp
movlw TMP ; make FSR point to it
movwf FSR
movlw 5 ; send 5 bit
movwf CNTBIT
goto SendCMD ; enter send data subroutine

END
APPENDIX E: KEEOQ.LKR

// File: keeloq.lkr
// Sample linker command file for mid-range with:
// 1 ROM page(2k), 2 RAM banks
// Lucio Di Jasio 09/26/01
//
LIBPATH .

CODEPAGE NAME=vectors START=0x0 END=0x4 PROTECTED
CODEPAGE NAME=page START=0x5 END=0x7FF
CODEPAGE NAME=.idlocs START=0x2000 END=0x2003 PROTECTED
CODEPAGE NAME=.config START=0x2007 END=0x2007 PROTECTED

DATABANK NAME=sfr0 START=0x0 END=0x1F PROTECTED
DATABANK NAME=sfr1 START=0x80 END=0x9F PROTECTED
DATABANK NAME=gpr0 START=0x20 END=0x6F
DATABANK NAME=gpr1 START=0xA0 END=0xBF PROTECTED

SHAREBANK NAME=gprnobnk START=0x70 END=0x7F
SHAREBANK NAME=gprnobnk START=0xF0 END=0xFF

SECTION NAME=STARTUP ROM=vectors // Reset and interrupt vectors
SECTION NAME=PROG ROM=page // ROM code space
SECTION NAME=IDLOCS ROM=.idlocs // ID locations
SECTION NAME=CONFIG ROM=.config // Configuration bits location
SECTION NAME=BANK0 RAM=gpr0 // allocates ram in bank0
SECTION NAME=BANK1 RAM=gpr1 // allocates ram in bank1
APPENDIX F: FASTDEC.INC

;**********************************************************************
;* Filename: FASTDEC.INC
;**********************************************************************
;* Author: Lucio Di Jasio
;* Company: Microchip Technology
;* Revision: Rev 1.00
;* Date: 26/SEP/01
;*
;* include file that exports:
;* relocatable library function for Keeloq Decrypt
;* decrypts the 32 bits in HOP0 (LSB) TO HOP3(MSB)
;* uses W as pointer to KEY0
;*
;*
;**********************************************************************
EXTERN Decrypt
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